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Asymmetrical Peremptories Defended:
A Reply
By Richard D. Friedman*
Three years ago, with the publication ofhis article ''An Asymmetrical Approach to the Problem of Peremptories" in this journal,
Professor Friedman initiated a debate on the subject that was taken
up in 1994 by three prosecutors who offered a rebuttal that was also
printed in these pages. Professor Friedman continues the debate.

I am not surprised that three prosecutors-even such able and
thoughtful advocates as Messrs. Helland, Light, and Richardsregard as distasteful to the point of abhorrence my proposal that
peremptory challenges be eliminated for the prosecution but
retained for the defense. • For that matter, I am equally unsurprised that defense counsel seem to think this is a great idea.
And perhaps the biggest nonsurprise is that I continue to adhere
to my view.
The prosecutors do not disagree with me that peremptories
for the defense ought to . be retained; our debate is whether
they ought to be retained for the prosecution. I concede the
prosecutors' point that Batson has not yet made the administrative
burden of prosecutorial peremptories intolerable. I suspect,
though, that the prosecutors would not belittle that burden if they
practiced in other jurisdictions, such as in the Deep South, where
(for a combination of reasons ofhistory, demography, procedure,
and personnel) the administrative burden has been far greater
than in Michigan federal court, and where extensive Batson
hearings and reversals have been far more common.
Even in their own court, however, the prosecutors can find
an excellent example of how probing an investigation a careful
judge may have to conduct to follow Batson conscientiously. In
*Professor, University of Michigan School of Law, Ann Arbor.
' Professor Friedman's original essay ''An Assymetrical Approach to the Problem
of Peremptories," appeared at 28 Crim. L. Bull. 507 (Nov./Dec. 1992). The
rebuttal appeared at 30 Crim. L. Bull. 242 (May/June 1994). This reply is based on
one that first appeared as "Prosecutors' Peremptory Challenges-A Response and
Reply,'' 37 Law Quadrangle Notes 44 (University of Michigan Law School Spring
1994).
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Echlin v. LeCureux, 2 Judge Avern Cohn held six days of hearings
before granting habeas corpus on the ground that a state prosecutor had discriminatorily exercised peremptories. The Sixth Circuit reversed, 3 but only by using a rather dubious avoidance
mechanism, denying the petitioners standing on the ground that
Powers v. Ohio, 4 one of the progeny of Batson, created a "new
rule'' and could not be applied retroactively.
Echlin is not atypical. Many courts have limited the burden
imposed by Batson by doing their best to avoid the case. Some
use the same approach as in Echlin. More commonly, courts
avoid difficulty by according extremely hospitable treatment to
the reasons proffered by counsel, particularly prosecutors, for
exercising their peremptories. Some of these reasons-' 'That
juror was scowling at me,'' 5 seem dubious and easy to manufacture. Others- "It wasn't that the juror is Hispanic; it was that
she speaks Spanish and so would listen to the actual testimony
rather than to the transcript" 6-should not pass the "straight
face" test.
Thus, I have difficulty with the idea that the rule of Batson
creates a ''conceptual mess' ' but not a practical mess. There are
doctrines on which this ''tough in theory, easy in practice'' type
of argument might have some force-doctrines for which the
difficult conceptual issues arise only occasionally, out on the
fringes where law professors love to roam. Batson is different.
Take, as a straightforward example, a criminal case with a black
defendant. Any time the prosecutor peremptorily challenges a
black juror, a potential Batson issue arises. How can we be
satisfied that race did not enter into the decision? By offering
peremptories, we invite prosecutors to indulge their hunches as
to how a potential juror will likely behave. But then we tell them
that they must put out of mind one of the most critical facts about
that person, one that may critically affect the juror's perspective
on the world and the relationship of the state to the individual.
This makes the exercise of peremptories, as well as the doctrine
governing them, incoherent.
2
3
4

5
6

Echlin v. LeCureux, 800 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
Echlin, 995 F. 2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1993).
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
See United States v. Jenkins, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 7937 (Apr. 11, 1995).
See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
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Aside from race, gender and religion are also crucial facts
that a party predicting a juror's attitudes in a given case may
well wantto know. Last year, in J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B. ,1
the Supreme court held that Batson applies to peremptories based
on gender; thus, the problem of incoherence has been extended
and aggravated. But several state courts have said that Batson
does not apply to peremptories based on religion, and in Davis
v. Minnesota, 8 the Court apparently signaled that it agreed with
them. The Minnesota Supreme Court, deciding before J. E. B. ,
had based its refusal to apply Batson to religiously based peremptories, in part on its belief that Batson would not be extended
beyond race; over a dissent by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia, the Supreme Court denied certiorari without even remanding for reconsideration in light of J. E. B. 9 The implication
of this line of cases is particularly troublesome: It is hard to look
benignly on blatant sex or religious discrimination in a context,
jury selection, that the Court has actively sought to rid of racial
discrimination.
Perhaps the courts will continue in large part to avoid the
consequences of this incoherence by turning their eyes away
from violations of Batson principles. We ought to be suspicious
of a rule when one argument for it is that it is widely ignored.
These difficulties would all be tolerable if there were any
compelling need to allow prosecutors to exercise peremptory
challenges. I do not believe there is. Wisely, my prosecutorial
critics do not appear to argue strongly that prosecutorial peremptories are necessary to prevent inaccurate pro-defendant verdicts.
Rather, they emphasize the harm that an outlier, perhaps an
irrational juror, might do by causing a hung jury.
I agree that this is a problem that must be addressed. Most
often, though, one outlier will not be enough to hang a jury. 10
7

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
9
Justice Ginsburg took the unusual step of writing an opinion concurring in the
denial of certiorari, pointing to reasons cited by the Minnesota court supporting its
decision.
10
My understanding is that usually-though of course not inevitably-one or two
holdouts ~n a jury of twelve do not cause the jury to hang; the pressure to go along
becomes mtense. Note also that unanimity among twelve-member juries is not
constitutionally required even in criminal trials. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972).
8
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Perhaps more significantly, relying on the prosecutor to address
the problem, and on a peremptory basis no less, is the wrong
way to go. It gives an advocate a blunderbuss, when what is
needed is judicial use of a scalpel. For one thing, most often,
prosecutors do not use their peremptories to remove outliers,
and it is not at all clear that they would be particularly good at it
anyway. Federal prosecutors ordinarily get six peremptories; in
picking a jury of twelve, there cannot, by definition, even be
that many outliers-because if there were that many, they would
not be outliers. Prosecutors, I believe, use most of their peremptories the way defense lawyers do-for comparison shopping.
Furthermore, if a venire member exhibits characteristics
making him or her unlikely to be an adequate juror, the trial
judge should be persuadable of that fact. If the judge-taking
into account the interest that the court and the prosecutor share
in preventing a hung jury-is not persuaded, why should an
advocate's peremptory contrary desire carry the day?
Thus, I conclude that, while defense peremptories are important, prosecutorial peremptories are not worthwhile. This leads
me to advocate an asymmetrical solution. Asymmetries in our
rules of criminal justice should not be adopted out of softheaded
sympathy for the defendant. Rather, they should be adopted only
when justified by the fact that the defendant and the prosecution
that seeks to punish him are in asymmetrical positions with
respect to the adjudication. Current law in the federal courts
and in many state systems usually gives more peremptories to
defendants than to prosecutors. Thus I do not even suggest
creating a new asymmetry; I would merely extend one that
already exists.
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